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ABSTRACT
Anti-money Laundering (AML) and Financial Fraud Detection (FFD) have been receiving 
increasing attention in the past few years, especially in light of the global financial crisis. 
Closer systems integration and a number of latest steep technological developments in areas 
like Big Data; High Frequency Trading; e-payments; and mobile payment systems, to name a 
few, are now promising enhanced risk management through superior decision support for the 
global financial industry. At the same time, however, resident regulatory frameworks, national 
and international, appear to lack the connectivity and flexibility required to support integrated 
AML and FFD approaches. This is strongly testified by the disparate technological approaches 
to FFD across different Financial Institutions and their reluctance to share practice within the  
industry.
  Focusing on Financial Transaction Fraud, this paper draws on the authors’ past research work 
which presented a prototype system that uses a workflow approach to identify abnormal financial 
transactions and applies Artificial Intelligence for classification. That work has shown successful 
applicability at short scale experiments, limited by the wide concern that information sharing 
should be achieved within the broader sector in order to achieve improved results. Drawing from 
there, this paper proposes that extending that approach across transaction infrastructure will 
deliver higher quality intelligent monitoring against Financial Transaction Fraud. 
  Following from that, we argue that the necessary technological maturity does exist to support 
full-scale operable FFD systems working on large disparate datasets. We then discuss the evidence 
in favour of the view that such systems can only be realised in the presence of wider regulatory 
consensus. There is, therefore, the need for a framework within which the technical infrastructure, 
business architecture and regulatory rules will harness that technological capability to deliver 
superior fraud prevention. 
  The paper first reviews computer-aided techniques and approaches for FFD available to the 
financial sector and discusses the business value of their application. It then addresses the main 
impediments for their full-scale applicability and uses an analytical framework for assessing 
their significance, in technological, business-specific and regulatory terms. A brief account of 
the authors’ workflow-based approach is then provided and its capabilities are outlined. 
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  In light of the above analysis, the paper proposes a techno-economic framework that will 
facilitate delivery of unified knowledge from large and disparate data sets of financial transactions. 
That, we propose, will augment fraud reduction capabilities and contribute to significantly lower 
associated costs.
Keywords: Financial fraud detection, Anti-money laundering, Transaction monitoring, Artificial 
intelligence
INTRODUCTION
Current consensus in Industry and Public Policy cycles is that Financial Fraud is, today more 
than ever, an acute problem facing the Financial Services Sector globally. Not least because 
of its impact on banks’ revenue and trust profile, the detection of Financial Fraud (henceforth 
FFD) has been moving up the agendas of Financial Services firms, regulatory authorities and 
technology providers alike [23, 24]. 
On the one hand, Financial Institutions are driven by compliance requirements under 
significant regulatory pressure (as testified by the recent fines imposed on major banks on 
grounds of non-compliance [23]), as well as pressure coming from their shareholder for cost 
reduction, operational efficiency and risk management [3, 4]. On the other hand, national 
and international agendas on crime prevention and security [23, 14, 24] begin to synch 
heavily with regulators’ interests in seeking further linkages between Financial Fraud and 
Money Laundering (ML), not least because of the former is now becoming a well-recognised 
source for the latter, while, in turn, ML is widely identified as the key vehicle for Terrorist 
Financing [25, 26]. On top of that, new technology-driven payment and remittance vehicles 
such as Bitcoins, e-currencies, or other means of exchange (conventional or less-so) and their 
potential linkage to activities such as Piracy at Sea or wider models of terrorist financing 
[1, 3] are all changing the Conventional Wisdom as to what Financial Fraud constitutes and 
how it may be accommodated by money exchange platforms within or outside the existing 
banking system. On the same grounds, it is argued that the linkage between FF and ML offers 
ample economic justification for organised crime to use ‘clever’ forms of Financial Fraud as 
an attractive vehicle [11].
Despite that pronounced importance, a unified technological approach to FFD does not appear 
to exist amongst practitioners in the Financial Services; in a direct analogy to the Paradox of Practice [7] 
 we contend that despite the existence of suitable mature technologies and techniques which 
promise feasible intelligent monitoring at larger-than-ever scale, intelligent FFD is far from 
reality; conversely, adopted solutions are largely rule-based, hence not making use of learning 
capabilities of available algorithms [12, 13]. 
In this work, we start from reviewing the current state of play in intelligent approaches for 
automated transaction monitoring and then briefly discuss the authors’ current contribution to the 
field [9, 10 ], which emphasises on scalability and the potential for handling large and diverse 
data sets. Drawing on these particular attributes, we discuss the value of the collective intelligence 
that can be leveraged using that approach through shared infrastructure. That, in turn, leads to 
the contention that a suitable co-ordination of technical and policy actions is required to fully 
enhance the performance of related Decision Support Systems and deliver the technological 
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potential of Intelligent Financial Fraud Detection and Deterrence. We ultimately propose how 
this co-ordination may be supported with the use of an Actor-based analytical framework [7]. 
We believe that this stakeholder-centred approach will help tune-in the contribution of different 
actors in redesigning anti-fraud processes and taking more informed practical steps in the future.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Financial Fraud has increasingly become an acute problem across the global industry. 
Accounting for annual losses of £38bn in 2011 in the UK alone, the cost of fraud has risen to 
£73bn in 2012 [17, 14, 18]. In global terms, in 2009 only fraud-related losses reached $2,75trn 
[19], reflecting an approximate 4.5% of total expenditure [20]. Given its economic impact, the 
problem of Financial Fraud provides a significant scope for Decision Support optimisation. 
Because of the nature of electronic money transfer, accurate labelling of financial transactions 
as genuine or fraudulent is paramount in ensuring customer trust, especially in light of the 
prevalence of user-driven electronic banking [7]. The authors’ previous work [15] suggested 
that misidentified fraud instances (false positives) are equally detrimental to customer trust 
as are unidentified instances of original fraud (false negatives). This adds significantly to the 
precision requirements of FFD processes and systems, and partly hints to the current reluctance 
to adopt unified industry-wide approaches. 
Despite the aforementioned reported economic importance of fraud [17, 14, 18, 19], no 
explicit FFD framework is widely recommended in the literature. Transaction-handling entities 
(such as banks and financial services providers) address the problem at the firm level, while 
authorities and independent bodies (such as the FSA, SOCA, BAI, SFO, NFA, FCA, among 
others) only address cases of large-impact financial fraud, typically linked to wider criminal 
activity [17, 18]. Occasionally Financial Institutions are seen to use bespoke rule-based 
monitoring systems to address the problem [21, 22]; however, the main approach to fraud 
involving small amounts is mainly addressed through fraud protection insurance. Indications 
therefore exist that no robust and reliable Decision Support is available to facilitate fraud 
identification across the board.
Useful contributions to classifying the literature on FFD types and existing approaches 
in Data Mining & Artificial Intelligence to address Financial Fraud were provided by Ngai 
et al. [16] where techniques such as Clustering, Classification, Prediction, Outlier Detection, 
Regression and Visualisation approaches, among others, populate the wider Computer Science 
literature.
AN INTELLIGENT FFD APPROACH
Financial organisations choose to deal individually with the problem of financial fraud since 
most of the information derives from their clients’ data. Therefore, an approach to tackle this 
problem could be to collect data anonymously from various sources. Such a policy should 
ensure firstly the integrity/anonymity of data as well as be able to deal with disperse and 
multivariate data origin sources. For the latter the current technological progress in the area of 
persistence could be useful if been subject to a number of modifications. The latest advances 
tackle the speed, volume and velocity limitations of traditional relational SQL databases [28] 
and work with unstructured schemas, close to the natural format of the data source. The current 
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operational spectrum can show a number of No-SQL [27, 28] solutions that can deal effectively 
with large and very large volumes of data, both in acceptable time windows and multivariate 
in terms of the production sources. Advances such as the effective slicing and dicing of Map 
– Reduce in accordance with Business Intelligence Cube solutions can be rather effective in 
working with diverse datasets. Additionally, the enforcement of distributed and aggregated 
solutions leads to more scalable approaches that seem centralised-free and scalable enough to 
meet the current needs of the financial sector. 
Such an approach if adopted by the Financial Services Sector and Financial authorities 
could lead to transaction monitoring at national and potentially international level, defining 
a different perspective in fraud identification. FFD can largely benefit from that since a new 
definition is given in transaction transparency and trace control regardless of the data origin 
while keeping vendor and client anonymity at the same time.
Fig. 1: FIs along with FAs Connected via an Anonymity Transaction Network for  
the Monitoring of the Latter
Figure 1 illustrates how an imposed layer of anonymity among FI data could lead to 
effective monitoring from FAs at scalable level. Such an approach could be suggested at 
preliminary level in order to test its efficiency, enhanced on demand according to a present 
agenda and enforced subject to results. Previous research of the authors [9, 15] has shown that 
business processes have several layers that could be used for monitoring purposes. Starting from 
the workflow orchestration, intelligent monitoring can be enhanced with the rule set needed 
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for latter pattern extraction. Moving to the execution of workflow, there can be several levels 
of abstraction that reveal resemblance among transactions, thus improving fraud identification. 
The constant retro-feed from FIs can lead to new pattern recognition(s) which will be re-used 
in the creation of an ideal pattern pool for general reference. 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: SEEKING ‘COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE’ 
WITH THE USE OF AN ACTOR-BASED APPROACH
In the previous section, we demonstrated a technological approach that is suited to augment 
Decision Support for identifying Financial Fraud through intelligent monitoring of transaction 
streams, viewed as workflows. While the system in its full scale implementation is yet to 
be delivered, its successful proof-of-concept demonstrated fully functionality and ability 
to aggregate disparate and heterogeneous data sources. Technical functionality is therefore 
available to support the desired collective intelligence.
Drawing from that, we now look further into how that technical feasibility can 
realistically be accommodated by the actual operational frameworks. The reasons why 
this is a challenge, are primarily related to:
1. The sensitive nature of transaction data which renders the use of open platforms 
unusable for their sharing;
2. Overlapping and often conflicting jurisdictions of financial institutions, regulators and 
other relevant authorities on the data to be used in the system;
3. The fact that existing infrastructure for handling FF is largely proprietary and thus 
tailored to individual needs and tied to the legacy systems of each financial institution;
4. The conflicting interests of involved parties in adopting a commonly acceptable FFD 
platform or approach;
5. Ultimately, the debate as to whether there is a need for establishing ownership of the 
resulting collective intelligence and, if so, the question as to which entity (regulator, 
national or supra-national authority, business or public consortium etc.) would own 
that intelligence.
The need for using a systematic analysis to place the problem in the context described 
above is dealt with through the use of the Actor-based Informed Grounded Theory [7, 8] an 
approach that was developed to make sense of how technological investment decisions are 
performed in UK banks.
The Actor-based Informed Grounded Theory argues that the problem of FFD has the shape 
and expression it currently has, not in spite of but because of the Actors who have addressed 
it in the past as well as now. This is a Social Construction-driven approach, which supports 
any potential shift in how the problem’s importance shifts across Policy Agendas through the 
years. Furthermore, according to this approach, any consensus about what the FFD problem 
is and how it should be addressed is driven by the educational background and professional 
training of the expert individuals and groups who investigated it. Those may be Practitioners 
or Observers, and their interests and views grow, live and evolve within a Community of 
Conventional Wisdom. The approach is diagrammatically represented in Figure 2 below.
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Fig. 2: The Actor-based IGT Model for Explaining the Social Construction of the FFD problem.  
The problem (marked by the thick line) is constructed through the perceived realities of each expert 
group of Practitioners or Observers and within the Community of Conventional Wisdom. Notice that the 
final ‘shape’ of the problem does not pre-exist. It is negotiated and reached through the interaction of 
Practitioners, Observers and the Community
The way that the framework can support an analytical approach to FFD is by facilitating 
an analytical model that actively takes account of interests; a pure Stakeholder Analysis 
(see [5, 6], among others) is not preferred here, as the relevant stakeholder grids1 used 
tend to pre-assign values to the importance of stakeholders , thus embodying assumptions 
that are established as conventions. The Actor-based approach, on the other hand, offers 
the additional opportunity for involving Actors’ expertise and background. 
In our Actor-based analysis the following parties are identified and categorised as 
Observers or Practitioners. In this analysis, Observers are interested parties with direct 
interests to the problem of FFD who, however, maintain indirect involvement in the practice 
of achieving fraud detection in its technical sense. Observers in our analysis include:
1  Typically, stakeholder analysis approaches adopt portfolio tools, typically names Stakeholder Grids, which 
map stakeholder attributes such as power, impact and interest against each other to enhance our understanding 
of a situation or problem.
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1. Universities and Academic Researchers from a multitude of disciplines, such as 
Finance & Accounting, Banking, Economics, Public Policy, Law, Information Systems, 
Computer Science (including Artificial Intelligence and Data Mining); these aim to 
promote specific research aims through academic publication and through attracting 
public or private research funding.
2. Commercial and other Market Research entities, such as consultancy firms, seeking 
the delivery of market intelligence (in the form of reports or knowledge services) as 
a marketable product for the Financial Services industry.
3. Regulatory Authorities, national or international, aiming to ring-fence broader societal 
and economic interests; secure balanced operation of the financial infrastructure; and 
provide against abuse of that infrastructure for criminal purposes.
On the other hand, Practitioners are these interested parties whose direct mission is to 
practically solve the problem of FFD as part of their business strategy. Our analysis identified 
Practitioners to be:
1. Financial Institutions, which are interested in serving their business model while 
ensuring regulatory compliance with Anti-Money Laundering Rules; 
2. Technology providers and vendors, which aim to develop technical solutions for 
Financial Services firms to automate or otherwise facilitate FFD.
The above categorisation may go further to identify sub-sections of each class of Actors; 
however, for the purposes of this paper, it is only used as a basis for discussing the involved 
interests.
IDENTIFYING PERTINENT INTERESTS
Having identified the key Actor classes, the discussion draws on the landscape around FFD on 
the basis of how Actors’ interests are interlinked. That discussion will lead to the conclusions 
where the necessity for integrating technical solutions with policy frameworks is stressed. 
To begin with, the interests of Universities and academic disciplines are represented and 
the research bodies avail themselves in the form of tools and approaches that are potentially 
usable in the industry. Interestingly, rarely are these approaches directly used in the industry; 
this, however, may come as no surprise since the specificities of proprietary systems (software 
and hardware architectures, legacy data management systems) do not allow for direct 
use.
On the other hand, the interest of the Financial Services industry on FFD is largely driven 
by compliance and regulation that dictates tighter Anti-Money Laundering controls, while 
at the same time there is significant pressure for controlling any related operating costs. On 
aggregate, the interests of Financial Services firms appear to lie in:
1. ensuring compliance in order to withstand regulatory audit;
2. minimising the costs of compliance (potentially through intelligent FFD support); 
3. improving their risk profile as deemed important for regulators, auditors, shareholders 
and customers;
4. avoiding loss of business while still projecting corporate social responsibility in the 
industry.
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Interests of technology providers and vendors are, however, different: attending to the 
service provision model, IT systems providers address the problem with a focus on sales and 
pursue establishment of their product suites across firms in the sector. Naturally, technology 
vendors have little interest in regulatory requirements as their main concern as these may 
introduce unnecessary restrictions and costs. Finally, because they often attend to license-
based models, they often are incompatible to each other and offer a significant extent for 
customisation, as this is what generates the bulk of their income.
Finally, regulatory authorities and policy-makers have a totally different agenda, not 
least because or their non-for-profit character. Their interest is that of ensuring against illicit 
profiteering, ring-fencing security and the interests of the state, serving tax collection efficiency, 
among other things, all within a framework that fosters healthy and untethered competition 
in the industry and does not reduce customer confidence on the economy. On the other hand, 
policy makers abound across industries and across fields and problem areas, as public policy 
and regulation grows organically: regulatory bodies and approaches are disparate across 
national jurisdictions and industries, which makes the combined problem of FFD, Anti-Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing further complex in regulatory policy terms. Furthermore, 
Financial Services regulators are not exclusively concerned with fraud and have to act in 
compliance with other bodies and authorities. The challenges for regulators introduced from 
the above mainly focus on:
(1) agreeing and sharing jurisdiction at national level while maintaining response speed 
and efficiency;
(2) supporting the sharing of data without failing jurisdiction requirements;
(3) ensuring coordination between them in order to materialise tangible or intangible 
gains for the state and the public; 
(4) maintaining and defending a standard of risk profile across the industry.
The above discussion of Actors’ interests provides an interesting and challenging landscape 
where technologies derived from applied academic research, vendor-driven technical solutions 
and bespoke proprietary approaches can only offer partial answers to Intelligent Financial 
Transaction Fraud, when operating in isolation. As explained in our Intelligent FFD approach, 
the desired optimal collective intelligence can be delivered through shared infrastructure 
(Figure 1). This poses, however, the open question of ownership of the derived collective 
intelligence, which calls for further consideration.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
This work has advocated for the necessity for systems integration, data sharing and co-ordination 
between industry and policy actors in the Financial Services world to achieve effective 
Intelligent Financial Fraud Detection and Deterrence. In so doing, it has demonstrated that this 
effort can only be optimised through developing collective intelligence across the industry; such 
an effort, the argument goes, is fraught with difficulty mainly because of (i) the confidential 
nature of the transaction data that would need to be shared; (ii) the competitive nature if the 
Financial Services industry where sharing of best practice is challenging; (iii) disparity of data 
sources and channels, which makes this an uneconomical exercise; (iv) disparity of interests 
between Financial institutions and regulatory authorities. 
Computer-aided Financial Fraud Detection 143
To overcome the obstacles, this article provided a framework to systematically record and 
analyse the role of Actors or interested parties in addressing the problem, ultimately aiming to 
contribute to informed consensus on both technological and policy-related facets of Intelligent 
Financial Fraud Detection and Deterrence. 
In technology terms, we suggested an intelligent, workflow-centred solution that was 
developed as part of the authors’ research in 2011-12 and updated to accommodate scalability 
and the capability for handling large and diverse data sets, while maintaining data anonymity; 
emphasis was placed on the system architecture that supports the aim of collective intelligence 
required to optimise the quality of delivered benefits. It is therefore contended that at least 
one technological solution can be made available to support this model.
In terms of policy, in turn, focus was placed on underlining the necessary conditions for 
practical implementation of that technological approach. That, we argued, can be served by 
surfacing the roles and – often disparate – interests of expert groups and individuals called 
Actors. 
By doing so, we come closer to addressing an open debate about whether and how the 
collective intelligence that results from our proposed approach can be governed to deliver 
superior results for Financial Institutions and wider socio-economic benefits.
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